Banking

How do markets regulate banking under capitalism without a central bank?

This video by Professor George Selgin examines the development, operation and performance of monetary systems in the absence of government intervention.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7gqYthq_c0

Topics covered include the spontaneous evolution of money, the rise of banks, bank self-regulation under competition and crisis management in the absence of a central bank. George Selgin is director of the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute, and professor emeritus of economics at the University of Georgia. This talk was recorded on July 6, 2015, at Objectivist Summer Conference 2015 in Charlotte, North Carolina.

How do government central banks create financial instability?

This video by Professor George Selgin shows why central banks, far from being bulwarks of financial stability, are inherently destabilizing.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXQ-W_DlI3c

The record of past “free banking” systems, in which paper currency consisted of competitively supplied banknotes, contradicts the widespread belief that central banks play an essential part in promoting financial stability. Instead, both that record and theoretical inquiries concerning how free banking arrangements regulate the money supply suggest that central banks, far from being bulwarks of financial stability, are inherently destabilizing. In particular, a free banking reform might have proven far more effective than the Federal Reserve Act in preventing U.S. financial crises. George Selgin is director of the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute, and professor emeritus of economics at the University of Georgia.  This talk was recorded live on July 2, 2014, at Objectivist Summer Conference 2014 in Las Vegas, Nevada.

How do coercive currency monopolies create booms and busts?

This talk explores the fiscal origins of currency monopolies and the adverse consequences stemming from their establishment, including their tendency to promote booms and busts; reviews the origins of the doctrine that they should serve as “lenders of last resort”; and explains why last-resort lending tends in practice to generate moral hazard problems that lead to still greater financial instability. Some time is devoted to the special case of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The speaker is George Selgin, director of the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute and professor emeritus of economics at the University of Georgia.

George Selgin is director of the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute, and professor emeritus of economics at the University of Georgia. This talk was recorded on July 6, 2015, at Objectivist Summer Conference 2015 in Charlotte, North Carolina.